Abstract. We formulate a Hilbert-style axiomatic system for STIT logic of imagination recently proposed by H. Wansing in [2] and prove its completeness by the method of canonical models.
We assume a propositional language with a countably infinite set V ar of propositional variables and the following set of modalities:
(1) SA understood as 'A is settled true'; the dual modality is P A understood 'A is possible'. (2) [c] a A understood as 'agent a cstit-realizes A'; the other action modality, namely, [d] a A to be read 'agent a dstit-realizes A', is in this setting a defined one with the following definition: [c] a A ∧ ¬SA.
(3) I a A understood as 'agent a imagines that A'. Among other things, all the agent indices are assumed to stand for pairwise different agents.
For these modalities we assume the following 'stit-plus-neighborhood' semantics originally defined by H. Wansing in [2] .
An imagination model is a tuple M = T ree, ≤, Ag, Choice, {N a | a ∈ Ag}, V , where:
• T ree is a non-empty set of moments, and ≤ is a partial order on T ree such that • The set History of all histories of M is then just a set of all maximal ≤-chains in T ree. A history h is said to pass through a moment m iff m ∈ h. The set of all histories passing through m ∈ T ree is denoted by H m .
• Ag is a finite set of all agents acting in T ree and is assumed to be disjoint from all the other items in M.
• Choice is a function defined on the set T ree × Ag, such that for an arbitrary m, a ∈ T ree × Ag, we the value of this function, that is to say Choice(m, a) (more commonly denoted Choice a , to which h belongs. In the special case when we have Choice m a = {H m }, it is said that the agent a has a vacuous choice at the moment m. In our models, Choice is assumed to satisfy the following two restrictions:
-"No choice between undivided histories": for arbitrary m ∈ T ree, a ∈ Ag, e ∈ Choice m a , and h, h ′ ∈ H m :
-"Independence of agents". If f is a function defined on Ag such that ∀a ∈ Ag(f (a) ∈ Choice a m ), then a∈Ag f (a) = ∅.
• The set of moment-history pairs in M, that is to say, the set
is then to be used as a set of points, where formulas are evaluated.
• For every a ∈ Ag, we have
. N a is thus a neighborhood function, defining, for every moment history pair m/h the set of propositions imagined by the agent a at the moment m in history h.
• V is an evaluation function for atomic sentences, that is to say,
The relation of satisfaction of sentences in the above defined language by momenthistory pairs in M is then defined inductively as follows:
For this logic we propose the following axiomatization:
Rules are as follows:
Note. Thus the proposed axiomatization is just the axiomatization of dstit logic proposed by Ming Xu plus axiomatization of the logic of I a as a minimal neighborhood modal system E plus the special axiom (A5) stating the action character of the imagination operator. Note also that the converse of (A5) easily follows from (A2), so that we actually have a biconditional here.
Our aim now is to get a strong completeness theorem for this system L with respect to the above semantics, in the following form: if Θ is an L-consistent set of sentences, then Θ has a model in your proposed semantics.
In what follows we will always use 'consistency' to mean 'L-consistency' and we let ⊢ stand for a relation of L-derivability.
In order to get the main theorem, we use the technique of canonical models, which is an adaptation of the corresponding techniques for the two respective parts of our system as mentioned in the Note above. In particular, we draw on [1, ch. 17] in many matters relevant to the purely STIT part of the following construction.
More precisely, we let W to be the set of all L-maxiconsistent sets of sentences and we denote the members of W as w, w ′ , w 1 etc. We set wRw ′ iff {A | SA ∈ w} ⊆ w ′ , and we set w ≃ a w
By standard modal logic, (A1) and (A2) ensure that all these relations are relations of equivalence; moreover, (A3) ensures that ≃ a ⊆ R for every a ∈ Ag.
Indeed, let w ≃ a w ′ and let SA ∈ w. By (A3) and maxiconsistency of w, we get [c] a A ∈ w, whence by w ≃ a w ′ we get that A ∈ w ′ . Since A was arbitrary, this means that wRw
′ . In what follows, we will be denoting equivalence classes of W with respect to R by X, X ′ , X 1 , etc. The set of all such equivalence classes will be denoted by Ξ. When restricted to an arbitrary X ∈ Ξ, the relation R turns into a universal relation, but relations of the form ≃ a can remain non-trivial equivalences breaking X up into several equivalence classes. We will denote the family of equivalence classes corresponding to ≃ a ↾ X by E(X, a).
Among the elements of W , we have a special interest in the maxiconsistent sets extending the following set of formulas:
The following facts are worth noting: (F1) There exists exactly one element in W , which extends Σ. We will denote this element by w. Indeed, one easily sees that Σ pre-determines every Boolean formula by fixing the literals. The modalities S and [c] a are then just vacuous in virtue of the definition of Σ. Finally, every maxiconsistent set extending Σ will have to contain ¬I a A for every formula A and every a ∈ Ag. For suppose otherwise. Then for some w ∈ W such that Σ ⊆ w, for some formula A and for some a ∈ Ag we will have I a A ∈ w. Then, by (A5) and maxiconsistency of w we will get ¬SI a A ∈ w. Therefore, by definition of Σ and maxiconsistency of w, we will get ¬I a A ∈ w, which contradicts the assumption that w ∈ W . Therefore, the statements with I a -modalities are also fixed for every w ∈ W , for which Σ ⊆ w. It is also easy to see that such a maxiconsistent w extending Σ must exist, since Σ itself is obviously consistent 1 (F2) It follows from the definitions of Σ and R that the R-equivalence set containing w, contains w only. We will denote this equivalence set by X.
We now proceed to the definition of our canonical model. First, we choose 2 an element 0 / ∈ Ξ ∪ W and define our set of moments:
We then set the following partial order on T ree. For arbitrary x, y ∈ T ree we have x ≤ y iff x = y, or y ∈ x or x = 0. This allows for a simple description of the set of histories in our frame. Every history turns out to have the form h w = 0, X, w , where X ∈ Ξ and w ∈ X. Thus, our set of histories is in one-to-one correspondence with W .
Thirdly, we define the choice function. It assigns a vacuous choice to every agent at every moment m, if m / ∈ Ξ. That is to say, the only choice of every agent at every such moment will be just the set of all histories passing through this moment. Otherwise, i.e. for the case when m = X ∈ Ξ, we define the choice function as follows:
Next, we need to define the imagination neighborhoods. We do this in the following way. N a (m/h) = ∅ for every a ∈ Ag and every m / ∈ Ξ. For the case when m = X ∈ Ξ, we need one further auxiliary notion. For every sentence A we set Ext(A) (read: extension of A) to be {X/h w | w ∈ X ∧ A ∈ w} if A / ∈ w; otherwise we set
Having defined the extensions, we set
for arbitrary w ∈ X ∈ Ξ. Finally, we define the evaluation function for variables in the following way:
We need to show that the canonical model M defined above is the model of our logic. The semantic restrictions are mostly seen to hold immediately; in particular, the no-choice-between-undivided-histories restriction holds because we only have undivided histories at the moment 0, where only vacuous choices are allowed. The only exception is the independence-of-agents restriction, which we treat below.
Lemma 1 (On Independence). Let m ∈ T ree and let f be a function on Ag such that
∀a ∈ Ag(f (a) ∈ Choice a m ). Then a∈Ag f (a) = ∅.
Proof. If m /
∈ Ξ, then the statement of the Lemma is obvious, since every agent will have a vacuous choice. We treat the case, when m = X ∈ Ξ. Consider a function f as described in Lemma. For every f (a) we fix e f (a) ∈ E(X, a) such that f (a) = {h w | w ∈ e f (a) } and we fix, further, an arbitrary w f (a) ∈ e f (a) . Since e f (a) is an ≃ a -equivalence class, there is a set Γ f (a) of sentences of the form [c] a A shared by all the members of e f (a) and only those members. Also, since X is an R-equivalence class, there is a set ∆ of sentences of the form SA shared by all (and only) members of X. Consider, then, the following set of sentences:
We claim that Λ is consistent. Assume otherwise. In this case Λ contains a finite inconsistent subset. Given that S and [c] a are S5-modalities, we can assume that this inconsistent subset has the following form:
where all the a 1 . . . a n are pairwise different (and moreover, Ag = {a 1 . . . a n }). We know, further, that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n we have SB, [c] ai A i ∈ w f (ai) . So, choose an arbitrary w ∈ X. For every 1 ≤ i ≤ n we have w f (ai) Rw, therefore, we must also have P [c] ai A i ∈ w for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Indeed, if it were otherwise, we would have S¬[c] ai A i ∈ w since w is maxiconsistent. But then, given that wRw f (ai) , we would have
Thus, we have in fact that
therefore, by (A4), we also have
This, in turn, means that the set
is consistent: otherwise, we would have that
and, by standard modal S5-reasoning, that
which, given that w ∈ X and hence ∆ ⊆ w, would mean inconsistency of w, a contradiction. Therefore, we may choose an arbitrary maxiconsistent w
an A n }, and by the fact that this set contains {A | SA ∈ ∆} we know that wRw ′ and thus w ′ ∈ X and further SB ∈ w ′ . This means that our finite subset in fact has a model and is not inconsistent. Therefore, since the finite set was arbitrary, Λ is consistent as well. Consider, then, an arbitrary maxiconsistent w ′′ extending Λ. Since ∆ ⊆ w ′′ , we have w ′′ ∈ X, and since Γ f (a) ⊆ w ′′ for arbitrary a ∈ Ag, we have w ′′ ≃ a w f (a) for every such a. This means, in turn, that w ′′ ∈ e f (a) for every a ∈ Ag, and so h w ′′ ∈ a∈Ag f (a) = ∅.
By now, the only ingredient to be added is the Truth Lemma; we divide it into two parts as follows.
Lemma 2 (Truth Lemma 1). Let m /
∈ Ξ and m ∈ h. Then, for any sentence A, the following holds:
Proof. We use induction on the construction of A. If A = p ∈ V ar, then A / ∈ w, and also m/h / ∈ V (A), since m / ∈ Ξ. Therefore, M, m/h A. The boolean cases are then trivial. If A = I a B, then A / ∈ w by (F1). We also have M, m/h A, since, given that m / ∈ Ξ, all the choices at m are vacuous.
Lemma 3 (Truth Lemma 2). Let X ∈ Ξ and w ∈ X. Then, for any sentence A, the following holds:
Proof. Again, we use induction on the construction of A. Atomic case we have by definition of V , and the boolean cases are obvious. We consider the modal cases. Let A = SB, and assume that SB ∈ w. Then take any h w ′ passing through X. In the context of M this means that w ′ ∈ X, which in turn means that wRw ′ . Therefore, we have B ∈ w ′ and, by induction hypothesis, M, X/h w ′ B. Since h w ′ was arbitrary, this means that M, X/h w SB.
On the other hand, assume that SB / ∈ w. This means that the set α = {C | SC ∈ w} ∪ {¬B} is consistent. Indeed, otherwise we would have
and further, by standard S5 reasoning {SC | SC ∈ w} ⊢ SB, and so, given, maxiconsistency of w, we would have SB ∈ w, contrary to our assumption. Therefore, consider an arbitrary w ′ ∈ W extending α. By definition, w ′ ∈ X, therefore h w ′ goes through X and we have, by induction hypothesis, that M, X/h w ′ B. Let A = [c] a B, and let [c] a B ∈ w. Then take any h w ′ such that h w ′ ∈ Choice a X (h w ). In the context of M this means that w ≃ a w ′ . Therefore, we have B ∈ w ′ and, by induction hypothesis, M, X/h w ′ B. Since h w ′ was arbitrary, this means that
On the other hand, assume that [c] a B / ∈ w. This means that the set
is consistent. Indeed, otherwise we would have
and further, by standard S5 reasoning
and so, given, maxiconsistency of w, we would have [c] a B ∈ w, contrary to our assumption. Therefore, consider an arbitrary w ′ ∈ W extending β. By definition, w ′ ≃ a w, and also w ′ ∈ X given that ≃ a ⊆ R. Therefore h w ′ goes through X and moreover h w ′ ∈ Choice a X (h w ). By induction hypothesis, we have that M, X/h w ′ B, and so, putting all together, that M,
First of all, note that by induction hypothesis and Lemma 2 we have the following biconditional:
Now, assume that I a B ∈ w. Then, by (A5), we also have [c] a I a B ∈ w and ¬SI a B ∈ w. Take any h w ′ such that h w ′ ∈ Choice a X (h w ). In the context of M this means that w ≃ a w ′ . Therefore, we have I a B ∈ w ′ . By definition of N a , this means that Ext(B) ∈ N a (X/h w ′ ). On the other hand, the fact that ¬SI a B ∈ w means that the set γ = {C | SC ∈ w} ∪ {¬I a B} is consistent. Indeed, otherwise we would have {C | SC ∈ w} ⊢ I a B, and further, by standard S5 reasoning {SC | SC ∈ w} ⊢ SI a B, and so, given, maxiconsistency of w, we would have SI a B ∈ w, contrary to our assumption. Therefore, consider an arbitrary w ′′ ∈ W extending γ. By definition, w ′′ ∈ X so that h w ′′ goes through X, and we have Ext(B) / ∈ N a (X/h w ′′ ) by definition of N a . Putting all this together, we get that, by (1) , {m/h | M, m/h B} ∈ N a (X/h w ′ ) for every h w ′ ∈ Choice a X (h w ) and {m/h | M, m/h B} / ∈ N a (X/h w ′′ ) for some h w ′ going through X. That is to say, we get that M, X/h w I a B.
On the other hand, if I a B / ∈ w, then, of course, Ext(B) / ∈ N a (X/h w ), and given the fact that h w ∈ Choice a X (h w ) and the biconditional (1), we get that M, X/h w I a B immediately. Now we are ready for our main result. Proof. Consider any maxiconsistent set w extending Θ and its corresponding R-equivalence class X. Then, by Lemma 3, we have M, X/h w Θ.
We also get compactness of L as a standard consequence of strong completeness.
